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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
SUPREME COURT NO. 36322-2009

PAMELA K. JOERGER STEPHEN,

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross Appellant,
)
)
)
vs.
)
)
SALLAZ & GATEWOOD, CHTD.,
DENNIS SALLAZ and SCOTT GATEWOOD,
)
)
Defendants-Appellants-Cross Respondents. )
)

RESPONDENT-CROSS APPELLANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District
in and for the County of Ada

HONORABLE MICHAEL R. MCLAUGHLIN, DISTRICT JUDGE, PRESIDING

Eric R. Clark
Clark & Associates, Attorneys
P.O. Box 2504
Eagle, ill 83616

Gary L. Quigley
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1296
Meridian, ID 83680

PlaintifflRespondent!Cross-Appellant
Pamela Stephen

Attorney for Defendant!Appellant!CrossRespondents Sallaz, and Defendants/CrossRespondents Sallaz & Gatewood, CHTD.,
and Scott Gatewood
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I.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. NATURE OF THE CASE
This appeal follows a legal malpractice case. The Plaintiff, Ms. Pamela Stephen,
prevailed in her legal malpractice case against Attorney Scott Gatewood, and the law firm of
Sallaz & Gatewood, Chartered in the district court.
In the Court's Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, it identified and explained Ms.
Stephen's contentions at trial.
The Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants were negligent in their representation of
her by failing to obtain an equal division of community assets in the divorce. The
Plaintiff asserts that she was suffering from a mental health condition that
impaired her understanding of the proceedings and that she did not receive
information about the divorce proceedings that would have allowed her to make
knowing and intelligent decisions about the settlement that was reached. Further,
the Plaintiff asserts that the Defendants failed to properly investigate the fair
market value of the Crescent Rim property and the correct amount of
indebtedness owing against that property and thus, she received a less than
equitable share of the community real property as a result of the failure of the
Defendants to investigate those issues.
(Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, pp. 1-2)

Contrary to the Appellant's claims, this appeal is not limited to "mentally impaired client"
issues. Ms. Stephen claimed and proved she was mentally impaired to such a degree as to avoid
any application of the defense of judicial estoppel. She also proved that Mr. Gatewood failed to
provide Ms. Stephen with relevant information about Mr. Stephen's estimated value of the
Crescent Rim property and about the validity of existing judgment liens against that property, and
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as Ms. Stephen did not have such knowledge, judicial estoppel was equally inapplicable. Finally,
Judge McLaughlin, following uncontroverted expert testimony, confirmed Mr. Gatewood's
conduct fell below the standard of care when he failed to investigate the value of the Crescent
Rim property and any attached liens. This failure directly and proximately caused Ms. Stephen
damages as she received substantially less value in the property division than she would have had
the Appellants acted within the standard of care.
B. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW
The Respondent generally agrees with the Appellants' rendition of the proceedings in the
district court.

C. STATEMENT OF FACTS - APPEAL and CROSS APPEAL
Ms. Stephen hereby incorporates her Statement of Facts as stated in her original filing, and
now adds facts relevant to the issues raised in the supplemental appeal and cross appeal.
Ms. Stephen disclosed her medical conditions to Gatewood during their initial meeting
and Gatewood memorialized these disclosures in his notes. (plaintiff's Ex. 121.) Ms. Stephen
disclosed she had 2 suicide attempts in the last 3 years, was "Bi-Polar," suffered from "post
traumatic stress," and was on "medication."
Ms. Stephen also stated she believed the value of the Crescent Rim home to be
$400,000.00. (Plaintiffs Ex. 121.)
Subsequently, Mr. Gatewood drafted and filed Answer and Counterclaim in which he
pled; "That Defendant/Counterclaimant lacks sufficient property to provide for her reasonable
needs and due to physical an,d emotional limitations is unable to support herself through
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employment. (Plaintiffs Ex. 102.) (Emphasis added)
Thereafter, Mr. Gatewood filed a Motion for Temporary Maintenance on August 4, 2003
in which Ms. Stephen testified in support through affidavit, "As a result of my physical and
mental and emotional limitations, I am not able to secure gainful employment to support myself"
(Plaintiff's Ex. 110, p. 2.)
Despite the burden of proof for the counterclaim for Spousal Maintenance, Gatewood
admitted that he made the decision not to obtain Ms. Stephen's medical records. (Tr., pg. 166,
LL. 14-29.)

~
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In the upper left-hand portion of Ms. Stephen's Mfidavit is the identification required by
Rule 10, IRep, of the attorneys appearing of record; both Sallaz and Gatewood are identified with
their respective Idaho State Bar Numbers, and below the attorney's information is the annotation
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"Attorneys for Defendants." (Emphasis added) (Plaintiff's Ex. 110.)
Gatewood testified he withdrew Ms. Stephen's Motion for Temporary Maintenance
because he thought that Ms. Stephen was essentially receiving de Jacto maintenance - not because

:~
,~-

!t

she did not need or deserve it. (Tr., pg. 191, LL. 1-19.)
'?"",'

In the underlying divorce proceeding, Mr. Stephen provided discovery responses on

!

September 10, 2003 in which he responded to a request for his opinion of the fair market value of
the community real property. Mr. Stephen opined the fair market value ofthe property was
$500,000.00. (plaintiff's Exhibit 105, p. 2; Answer to Interrogatory No.1.)
Mr. Stephen also listed the Beach Street rental property as both a community property

i
£

asset and community property debt. (plaintiff's Exhibit 105, p. 2 and 4; Answer to Interrogatory
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Nos. 1 and 3.)
In these same responses, Mr. Stephen indicated his belief that Ms. Stephen was entitled to
"one-half of the community property." (plaintiffs Exhibit 105, p. 11, Answer to Interrogatory
No. 29.)
Approximately a week later, Mr. Stephen provided supplement discovery responses in
which he attached a lab report which appeared to indicate a positive response to a drug screen for
amphetamine. (Plaintiff's Ex. 106.)
On November 7,2003, Gatewood prepared and served his clients responses to discovery
in the divorce action. In his reply to Interrogatory No.1, he indicates Ms. Stephen believed the
value ofthe Crescent Rim property was $385,500.00, or one hundred fourteen thousand five
hundred dollars less than Mr. Stephen's opinion of the value of the same property. (Plaintiffs
Ex. 108, p. 2.)
At trial, Gatewood could not recall discussing Mr. Stephen's $500,000.00 valuation with
Ms. Stephen. (Tr., pg. 174, LL. 21 to pg. 175, LL. 1.)
Ms. Stephen testified that she had not received any of Mr. Stephen's discovery responses,

II
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(Plaintiff's Ex. 105, 106 and 107.), before the divorce trial on August 5, 2004. (Tr., pg. 410, LL.
12, to pg. 411, LL. 23.)
Ms. Stephen also testified that she never reviewed any ofthe Plaintiff's discovery
responses in the divorce case. (Tr., pg. 411, LL. 25, to pg. 412, LL. 3.)
Gatewood noted in the divorce file that on January 27,2004, during a "phone call to
client," Ms. Stephen inform«d Gatewood that a "Dr. wanted to hospitalize [Defendant] ["delta"
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sign in original]," and that Ms. Stephen "has been in bed for 5 days." Gatewood noted, "she
sounded groggy - not very responsive." (plaintiffs Ex. 122.)
On July 27,2004, a week before the trial, Ms. Stephen called and spoke with Mr.
Gatewood. During this conversation, Ms. Stephen told Mr. Gatewood she had been hospitalized
for a week. (plaintiff's. Ex. 123.) Gatewood testified that despite his knowledge of Ms. Stephen's
mental conditions he did not investigate the circumstances of Ms. Stephen's hospitalization.
Gatewood testified that he did not inquire where she had been hospitalized or what necessitated
the hospitalization. (Tr., pg. 215, LL. 1, to pg. 220, LL. 19.)
Ms. Stephen testified she spoke with Gatewood the day before the trial, and asked him to
seek to postpone the trial because she was not feeling well. She testified that Mr. Gatewood
responded, "The judge doesn't do that mental health thing," and that if she wanted to delay the
trial she would have to get a "note from her doctor". (Tr., pg. 413, L. 18, to pg. 416, L. 7.)
At trial Ms. Stephen presented a "Satisfaction of Judgment" with an attached Writ of
Execution, which indicated the "Crescent Rims Suit" judgment had been satisfied on June 23,
2004 - well before the divorce trial. (plaintiff's Ex. 117.)
Gatewood testified t4at he was aware of the encumbrance but did not know the status or
validity on the day of trial. (Tr., pg. 607, LL. 4-12.)
Gatewood then testified that he did not think, had Judgment been paid before the divorce
was finalized, that it would have made any difference to the property division. (Tr., pg. 607, LL.
13-16.)
The Judgment and Decree of Divorce indicates in Exhibit A that the value ofthe Crescent

RESPONDENT-CROSS APPELLANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF - 6

I
tit

11.''-.·.··

I
I
I
I
I
I

Rim property was $385,500.00. Mr. Stephen is also credited with $28,000 for the "Crescent Rim
suit." (plaintiff's Ex. 103.)
To equalize the division of property, Mr. Stephens would have had to pay approximately
half of $65,000 on or about August 5, 2004. (Tr., pg. 516, L. 6, to pg. 516 L. 10.)
Ms. Shepard testified the parties agreed to monthly payments to satisfy the equalization of
the division of community assets because Mr. Stephen was unable to pay a lump sum payment at
that time. (Tf., pg. 516, LL. 11 - 25.)
The Decree provides for payment of $2000.00 per month, minus rent as "equalization
payments." (plaintiff's Ex. 103.)
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There is no indication on the audio recording of the divorce trial on August 5, 2004, that
Gatewood informed Judge Day that his client had recently been involuntarily committed to a
psychiatric ward, that his client was taking a substantial amount of potentially mind-altering or
cognitive-impairing medications, or that his client had just asked Mr. Gatewood to seek to
postpone the trial until she felt better. (Defendant's Ex. 210.)
The audio recording of the divorce trial confirms that Ms. Stephen, when asked by Judge
Day if she agreed to the settlement as presented "is a complete resolution of all the property and
debt division issues in your divorce case," she responded, "As far as I know." (Defendant's Ex.
210.)
Ms. Stephen presented evidence that spousal maintenance was an issue for Ms. Stephen
throughout the divorce trial. Gatewood filed a counterclaim seeking spousal maintenance
(Plaintiff's Ex. 102.), and then filed a motion for temporary maintenance in August 2003
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(plaintifrs Ex. 110.). Gatewood then discussed this issue with the Court during the May 3,2004
status conference, (Plaintiff sEx. 113.), and again during the pretrial conference on July 19, 2004.
(Plaintifrs Ex. 114.) While Ms. Stephen withdrew her claim for spousal maintenance in this
case, that issue is relevant to determine Ms. Stephen's state of mind on August 5,2004, when she
appeared for trial expecting to receive spousal maintenance.
In discovery responses in this case dated February 7,2007, Mr. Gatewood alleged that Ms.
Stephen only filed this case "after her temporary maintenance ended." (Plaintiffs Ex. 118, p. 2,
Answer to Interrogatory No.6.) (Emphasis added).
Ms. Shepard testified the parties agreed to monthly payments to satisfy the equalization of
the division of community assets because Mr. Stephen was unable to pay a lump sum payment at
that time. (Tr., pg. 516, LL. '11-25.)
D. STANDARD OF REVIEW - APPEAL AND CROSS APPEAL
This Court will review a trial court's decision to ascertain "whether the evidence
supports the findings of fact, and whether the findings of fact support the
conclusions oflaw." Alumet v. Bear Lake Grazing Co., 119 Idaho 946, 949, 812
P.2d 253, 256 (1991). This Court does not set aside findings of fact unless they
are clearly erroneous. Marshall v. Blair, 130 Idaho 675, 679, 946 P.2d 975, 979
(1997). Thus, if the findings offact are supported by substantial and competent
evidence, although conflicting, this Court will not disturb those findings. Carney
v.. Heinson, 133 Idaho 275, 281, 985 P.2d 1137, 1143 (1999).
Idaho Forest Industries, Inc. v. Hayden Lake Watershed Imp. Dist., 135 Idaho 316, 318, 17 P.3d
260, 263 (2000).
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II.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Whether there was substantial and competence evidence to support the Court's Findings
of Facts and Conclusions of Law - regardless of the Respondent's mental condition?
2. Whether the Appellants were entitled to the affirmative defenses of judicial estoppel or
judgmental immunity when the evidence indicates the Respondent was unaware of certain
important facts?
.
3. Whether the Respondent is entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees on appeal
according to Rule 40, IAR, Rule 41, IAR and I.C. § 12-120(3)?
ill.

ISSUES PRESENTED ON CROSS-APPEAL
1. Whether the Trial Court erred when it reduced the equalization payment to which the
parties agreed in consideration for Mr. Stephen having 24 months to pay to equalize the
community estate?
2. Whether the Trial Court erred when it found that Mr. Sallaz was not personally liable to
the Respondent, when the law firm was a partnership, and when Sallaz had appeared as
her attorney of record, yet did nothing to ensure her case was pursued appropriately?
3. Whether the Cross Appellant is entitled to an award of costs and attorney fees on this
cross appeal according to Rule 40, IAR, Rule 41, IAR and I.e. § 12-120(3)?
IV.

ARGUMENT - APPEAL
A. THERE WAS SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTING
JUDGE MCLAUGHLIN'S RULING THAT GATEWOOD'S CONDUCT FELL
BELOW THE STANDARD OF CARE - REGARDLESS OF THE PLAINTIFF'S
MENTAL STATE.
The majority of the Appellants' argument on appeal addresses a claim that Judge
McLaughlin somehow erred when deciding the negligence issue as applied to a mentally impaired
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or mentally diminished client. However, the Court clearly reached its decision based the
alternative that Gatewood failed to provide Ms. Stephen with relevant information - regardless of
her mental state.
Even assuming the Plaintiff was not impaired, the issue of the investigation
by Gatewood as to the valuation of the Crescent Rim property demonstrates an
additional breach of duty on the part of Gatewood. Stephan initially placed a value
of $500,000 on the property and the Plaintiff initially placed a value of $400,000 on
the property. This is a significant disparity as testified to by Ms. Naugle.
The evidence establishes that the Plaintiff was not advised by Gatewood that
Stephan had placed a value of $500,000 on the Crescent Rim property. The Plaintiff
was not aware of this even at the time of negotiations for the division of community
real property. This is vital information to a party to divorce litigation because the
higher value may have been the correct value for the property.
Ms. Naugle testified as an expert on behalf ofthe Plaintiff that Gatewood
failed to meet the applicable standard of care for an attorney practicing in 2003 and
2004 by not seeking a comparative market analysis of the Crescent Rim property.
Even if the Plaintiff was short of funds, Ms. Naugle testified that a real estate
agent, at little or no expense, could have shed more objective light on this real
property valuation issue. As Ms. Naugle testified, this variance is too significant to
rely on the client's information alone. (Naugle Testimony, Tr., p. 268, L. 11, to p.
269, L. 4.)
What is of concern to the Court is that Stephen, who initially gave an
opinion that the property was worth $500,000, was awarded the residence.
Gatewood testified that he had heard from Stephen's attorney, Ann Shepard, that the
Plaintiffwas very knowledgeable about the fair market value of the residence.
However, in light of the fact that the Plaintiff was possibly impaired from
methamphetamine use and was, by Gatewoods's own notations in her file, showing
signs of deterioration as to her mental health, he breached the duty he owed to his
client when he failed to investigate this critical valuation issue in this case. The
$385,000 that the Plaintiff had subsequently indicated the property value on the
Crescent Rim property to be worth was the valuation used in the calculation of the
division of the community real property.
(Findings of Fact, p. 9, L. 24 to p. 11, L. 4.)

The Court's findings are supported by substantial and competent evidence.
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First, as Judge McLaughlin noted, Mr. Stephen provided discovery responses in the
divorce case and in response to a request that Mr~ Stephen "describe all real property which you
claim is community property of you and the Plaintiff [sic] and state your estimate of the value of
said property," Mr. Stephen responded that he estimated the value of the Crescent Rim home to
be "500,000.00." (plaintiffs Ex. 105, p. 2.) Mr. Stephen also indicated that he believed the
Defendant Ms. Stephen was entitled to "one-half of the community property." (plaintiff's Ex.
105, p. 11.) Mr. Stephen provided these responses in September 2003; well before Ms. Stephen
provided her responses.
At trial, Gatewood could not recall reviewing these responses, could not recall discussing
these responses or Mr. Stephen's value with Ms. Stephen, nor could Gatewood provide any
evidence that he or his office ever sent a copy of the responses to Ms. Stephen. Sallaz also
testified that he never met personally with Ms. Stephen.
Ms. Stephen testified at trial she never received a copy of Mr. Stephen's discovery
responses or knew he had valued the property at $500,000.00.
Thereafter, Mr. Stephen responded by sending similar requests. Ms. Stephen, after
meeting with Gatewood or his staff members, replied that in her opinion the value of the Crescent
Rim property was $385,000.00. (Plaintiffs Ex. 108, p. 2.)
A reasonable person could deduce, based on Ms. Stephen's response that neither she nor
Gatewood knew that Mr. Stephen had placed a substantially higher value on the property, because
her response had the net effect of reducing the value of Ms. Stephen's portion of the community
estate by approximately $57,500.00.

RESPONDENT-CROSS
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That deduction is sound as it applied to the attorney as based on Mr. Stephen's
$500,000.00 opinion it is unclear why any attorney would advise his client to essentially bid
against herself and provide a lower value when doing so would negatively impact the ultimate
value of the community estate. A reasonable attorney, assuming that attorney had read the
opposition's discovery responses, would have advised his client to either agree with the
$500,000.00 figure unless the client could prove the figure was low, or could provide some
indication to the Attorney as to why the client was insisting the value was less than proposed. If
the client proceeded to dema.nd the property was valued less - essentially bidding against herself,
when the net result would have substantially reduced the value of the community estate, the
Attorney would be on notice that perhaps his client is not acting rationally.
That deduction is equally valid as applied to the client. Assuming the client had a full
understanding of the facts - that the opposition had placed a value on an asset in a verified
discovery response and that value would probably be upheld in Court unless the client could
prove the value was understated, then it is nonsensical for a client to offer a lower opinion of
value, as doing so would be financially detrimental.
The reality, as Judge McLaughlin concluded based on the evidence, is the Appellants
failed to read Mr. Stephen's discovery responses and had no idea of the $500,000.00 valuation,
nor had any idea throughout'their representation, and even on the date of trial. Further, the
Court's conclusion that Ms. Stephen had no knowledge of the $500,000.00 valuation is equally
supported. No reasonable person, with full knowledge and understanding of the facts, would have
acted in such a manner.

RESPONDENT-CROSS APPELLANT'S SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF - 12

I
The Court's ruling on the $28,000 judgment lien was also supported by substantial and

I
I

I
I
I
I
I
I
I
I

I
I
I

I
I

I

competent evidence.
There was a claim in this case that there was a $28,000 judgment lien
against the Crescent Rim property that should not have been listed as a debt in the
presentation to Judge Day. Exhibit 117, the $28,000 indebtedness against the
Crescent Rim property as set out in the decree of divorce had in fact been paid
nearly two months prior to the divorce trial. The Plaintiff indicated that she did not
know the status of this debt when she answered the request for discovery in Exhibit
108. Other than the list of debts set forth in Exhibit A attached to the divorce
decree and Stephan's answer to Interrogatory No.3, no other investigation was
done by Gatewood to determine the status of this debt. Gatewood should have
obtained documentation as to this debt prior to the settlement agreement.
(Findings of Fact, p. 13, LL. 11-20.)
The Judgment and Decree of Divorce indicates in Exhibit A Mr. Stephen was credited
with $28,000 for the "Crescent Rim suit." (Plaintiff's Ex. 103.)
At trial, Ms. Stephen presented evidence that this "debt" was satisfied as of June 23, 2004
and before the divorce. Mr. 'Stephen apparently paid the underlying judgment of $29,83 5.44, plus
accruing interest and costs for a total of$30,214.79, before the divorce was finalized with
community funds. l As this debt was paid, Mr. Stephen was not entitled to a $28,000.00 "credit"
for this debt in the property settlement agreement. (Plaintiff sEx. 117.)
At trial, Ms. Stephen proved that the Appellants failed to read or consider Mr. Stephen's
discovery responses, that the Appellants had no idea of the circumstances surrounding the lien
created as a result of the "Crescent Rim suit," and that the Appellants failed to conduct even a
minimal or cursory investigation to determine the source, validity or status of the resulting lien.

1 The Appellants suggested at trial that Mr. Stephen had paid the judgment from separate property funds, but failed to
support such a claim with any evidence.
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Judge McLaughlin correctly ruled that under the circumstances, the Appellants' conduct fell
below the standard of care.

B. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT JUDICIAL ESTOPPEL DID
NOT APPLY.
The application of judicial estoppel is not absolute. The Supreme Court in McKay v.

Owen, 130 Idaho 148, 937 P.2d 1222, (1997) discussed criteria that would preclude the
application of judicial estoppel under the appropriate circumstances.
This decision does not mean that attorneys will never be accountable for their
negligence whenever there has been a settlement in the underlying transaction. If a
client does not learn of the grounds for, or facts giving rise to, legal malpractice
until after the settlement has been approved, the policies behind judicial estoppel
will not be furthered, and the doctrine should not be employed. For guidance
purposes and to avoid misapplication of judicial estoppel, it should be made
clear that the concept should only be applied when the party maintaining the
inconsistent position either did have, or was chargeable with, full knowledge
of the attendant facts prior to adopting the initial position. Stated another
way, the concept of judicial estoppel takes into account not only what a party
states under oath in open court, but also what that party knew, or should have
known, at the time the original position was adopted. Thus, the knowledge that
the party possesses, or should have possessed, at the time the statement is made is
determinative as to whether that person is "playing fast and loose" with the court.

McKay v. Owen, 130 Idaho at 155. (Emphasis added)
Judge McLaughlin properly denied this defense based on the evidence that Ms. Stephen
never knew about the substantial value that Mr. Stephan has placed on the Crescent Rim property
or that Mr. Stephen had paid the judgment lien prior to the trial. As Ms. Stephen had no
knowledge of these facts, judicial estoppel cannot apply.
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C. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THE APPELLANTS WERE NOT

ENTITLED TO JUDGMENTAL IMMUNITY.
The Appellants cite to Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc. v. Rosholt, Roberston & Tucker, 133
Idaho 1,981 P.2d 236 (1999), and argue they are entitled to reversal based on application of
"judgmental immunity." This was a case of first impression in Idaho for application of this
principle and the Supreme Court articulated its understanding of the requisite elements.
The "rule" as applied in other jurisdictions has been articulated in different
ways.(fn1) Most commonly it appears that the courts have simply ruled that in
certain circumstances an attorney is not liable "as a matter oflaw" and thus, the
issue need not be submitted to a jury for decision. All courts acknowledge the
standard of care with which all attorneys must comply and that is: they are held to
that degree of care, skill, diligence and knowledge commonly possessed and
exercised by a reasonable, careful and prudent lawyer. The courts have then held
as a matter of law that an attorney cannot be held liable for failing to correctly
anticipate the ultimate resolution of an unsettled legal principal. See, e.g.,
Halvorsen v. Ferguson, 46 Wash.App. 708, 735 P.2d 675, 681 (1986).
Other courts have stated that, in the context of litigation, an attorney will not be
held liable for a mere error in judgment or trial tactics if the attorney acted in good
faith and upon an informed judgment. See, e.g., Simko v. Blake, 448 Mich. 648,
532 N.W.2d 842, 847 (1995). The "non-liability" rule in both situations,
however, is conditioned upon the attorney acting in good faith and upon an
informed judgment after undertaking reasonable research of the relevant
legal principals and facts of the given case. See, e.g., Smith v. Lewis, 13 Ca1.3d
349, 118 Cal.Rptr. 621, 530 P.2d 589, 595 (1975). In other words, an attorney
must act with that degree of care, skill, diligence and knowledge commonly
possessed and exercised by a reasonable, careful and prudent lawyer.
Sun Valley Potatoes, Inc. v. Rosholt, Roberston & Tucker, 133 Idaho at 4-5. (Emphasis
added.)
Ms. Stephen proved that the Appellants failed to investigate her medical conditions, failed
to review Mr. Stephen's discovery responses, failed to provide Mr. Stephen's discovery responses
to Ms. Stephen or even discuss the information contained in those responses, failed to investigate
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the value of the real property, and failed to investigate and determine the validity of the status of
the judgment lien on the Crescent Rim property.
First, it would appear no judgment or opinion could be "informed" when the attorneys
rendering the opinion lacked knowledge of relevant facts. Then, refusal to apply judgmental
immunity is warranted in this case as all of the relevant facts were available to the Appellants
with minimal effort. They simply refused to review the information they had obtained through
discovery or failed to exert minimal effort to obtain information they knew existed.
Clearly, the Appellants are not entitled to judgmental immunity as Judge McLaughlin
ruled, as the evidence establishes a lack of even minimal research or investigation.
D. JUDGE MCLAUGHLIN APPLIED THE CORRECT STANDARD AND HIS
FINDINGS WERE SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT
EVIDENCE.

The Appellants filed a counterclaim in which they alleged Ms. Stephen, " ... lacks
sufficient property to provide for her reasonable needs and due to physical and emotional
limitations is unable to support herself through employment. (plaintiffs Ex. 102.) (Emphasis
added) However, despite th~s pleading, and the associated duty for the attorney to investigate the
allegations, (Rule 11(a)(1), IRCP.), the Appellants did nothing to determine the validity of this
claim.
Ms. Stephen disclosed her medical conditions to Gatewood at their initial meeting, and
that disclosure prompted the Appellants to draft and file a counterclaim that include the allegation
stated above as a basis for spousal maintenance. (plaintiffs Ex. 120-12l.)
Gatewood documented a phone call on January 27,2004, during which Ms. Stephen
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informed Gatewood that a "Dr. wanted to hospitalize [Defendant] ["delta" sign in original]," and
that Ms. Stephen "has been in bed for 5 days." He also noted that "she sounded groggy - not very
responsive." (plaintiffs Ex. 122.)
Then just a week before trial, Ms. Stephen told Gatewood she had in fact been
hospitalized. (plaintiffs. Ex. 123.) Despite his knowledge of Ms. Stephen's mental conditions
Gatewood did absolutely nothing - he did not even enquire why she had been hospitalized, where
she had been hospitalized, or her current status - whether she was under a doctor's continuing
care. (Tr., pg. 215, LL. 1, to pg. 220, LL. 19.)
As noted above, Ms. Stephen testified she spoke with Gatewood the day before the trial,
and asked him to seek to postpone the trial because she was not feeling well. She testified that
Mr. Gatewood responded, "The judge doesn't do that mental health thing," and that if she wanted

to delay the trial she would have to get a "note from her doctor." (Tr., pg. 413, L. 18, to pg. 416,
L. 7.)
In the Court's Findings of Facts, it noted its basis for the decision - namely that Gatewood
had many indications that should have alerted him to investigate Ms. Stephen's medical
conditions, notwithstanding his duty under Rule II(a)(I), IRCP, but he simply chose not to seek

I
I
I
I
I
I

that information. The Court's ruling is supported by substantial and competent evidence.
When a client has been involuntarily hospitalized and the client's attorney
has had to go to the client's home to communicate with that client on ten occasions,
there is obviously a problem that should have been addressed by Gatewood either
through contact with the Plaintiffs medical providers to determine her level of
impairment or appointment of a guardian ad litem. In the alternative, Gatewood
should have advised Judge Day of the recent hospitalization so that a continuance
could have been granted to give the Plaintiff additional time to process these issues
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I
or for the appointment of a guardian ad litem. This is clearly allowed under the
Rules of Professional Conduct and not a violation of client confidences. Gatewood
had more than ample information and personal observations that should have
alerted as to his duty to inquire further about the Plaintiff's mental health status.
Other than Gatewood's testimony, no other lawyer expert testified for the
Defense on this issue of duty or for that matter any other aspect of the issue of
negligence.
(Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Judgment, pp. 1-2.)
The Appellants argue notwithstanding their lack of even minimal investigation or
diligence, it really did not matter because Ms. Stephen still received a "good dea1."
Scott Gatewood was confronted with a situation in which the best opportunity for a
favorable resolution of the case for his client was the settlement offered by Ann
Shepard. Mr. Gatewood testified about unfavorable issues that were emerging in the
case that had not been disclosed to him by Pam Stephen. (Tr., pg. 184, L. 2 to pg.
186, L. 24). Ms. Shepard had advised Scott Gatewood that considering the
underlying facts of this particular case, that she thought she could get a better deal
for Gary Stephen if they went to trial, but was willing to make the favorable offer in
order settle the matter without a trial. (Tr., pg. 510, L. 12 to pg. 513, L. 5). Scott
Gatewood concurred with Ms. Shepard's assessment that he would be unlikely to
obtain a better deal for his client, Pam Stephen, at trial, than he would be able to
obtain through the offered settlement. (Tr., pg. 184, LL. 2-22).
Appellants' Brief, p. 44.
However, this was an irreconcilable differences divorce, so it is unclear just what the
Appellants mean by "getting a better deal" at settlement as opposed to going to trial? Assuming
he had read Mr. Stephen's discovery responses, Gatewood could easily have argued at trial the
Court should have used Mr. Stephen's figures, and therefore increased the value of the estate by
nearly $60,000.00 to his client. What about the $28,000.00 lien? The net effect of that error cost
Ms. Stephen $14,000.00. If the case went to trial, the judge would have to have discounted the
$28,000 credit to Mr. Stephen because the debt was paid.
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The Appellants also raise the issue of the quitclaim deed for the Beach Street rental
property. Contrary to the Appellants' contention the Beach Street rental property was Mr.
Stephen's separate property based on a quitclaim deed, the property was purchased with
community funds during the marriage, the mortgage was paid for with community funds, and Mr.
Stephen would have testified to these facts. Moreover, the Appellants failed to introduce the deed
into evidence at trial. All this Court has for evidence on appeal is Mr. Stephens' verified
testimony in a discovery response that the Beach Street property is community property and
subject to community debt. (plaintiffs Ex. 105, p. 2 and 4.)
The Appellants also argue that there was evidence that Ms. Stephen had committed
"waste" and if the case went to trial, Mr. Stephen would have been entitled to an offset for the
alleged waste. Although Ms. Shepard testified she was going to claim Ms. Stephen had
committed waste, she testified at trial she had no proof that Ms. Stephen was responsible for any
damage to either residence or had made any improper payments from community funds.
The bottom line, the Appellants failed even to do minimal investigations regarding the
community or separate property assets and then ignored or disregarded what evidence they did
obtain through discovery. The Appellants could not go to trial because they were completely
unprepared and uninformed, not because of some feigned contention they did the best they could
have done for their client.
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E. THERE IS MALPRACTICE LIABILITY FOR A LAW FIRM - AS A MATTER OF
LAW.
In the case below, Appellant Sallaz represented through discovery, " ... during the time of
the divorce in Case No. CV DR 03-01151D, this Defendant was associated with attorney Scott
Gatewood there were both members of the corporation Sallaz & Gatewood." (plaintiff's Ex. 119,
p. 2, Response to Interrogatory No.4.) (Emphasis added). However, the fee agreement at issue
was signed on June 16,2003, (plaintiff's Ex. 100.), but Sallaz and Gatewood was not formed as a
corporation until September 9,2003. (Plaintiffs Ex. 129 and 130.) At trial, when confronted with
these facts, Gatewood testified that he and Sallaz were a partnership before forming their
"professional services" corporation. (Tr., p. 138, LL. 2-25.)
Ms. Stephen asserted below that Sallaz was jointly and severally liable to her for her
damages as she contracted with Sallaz & Gatewood when it was a partnership, and as there was
no evidence that Sallaz & Ga.tewood merged their partnership into the corporation, or that the
corporation had acquired, ratified or assumed the contractual obligations of the partnership.
Judge McLaughlin considered the arguments, but concluded that as Sallaz & Gatewood, CHDT.
had formed and the negligence occurred after the formation, then I.e. § 30-1306 would apply and
shield Sallaz from personal liability unless Sallaz had rendered legal services personally or had
been supervising Gatewood.
On appeal, it appears that the Appellants are agreeing with Ms. Stephen and the Court
should not have found the professional service corporation liable, but as Sallaz & Gatewood was
a partnership, Sallaz and Gatewood are liable jointly and severally. Based on that argument, Ms.
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Stephen would concede this issue and on remand the Court should enter judgment against Sallaz
and Gatewood jointly and severally, and not against the law firm.
To the extent the Appellants are arguing that their professional services corporation is not
liable for the actions of its "officers, shareholders, agents or employees," then the Appellants are
ignoring the clear language ofldaho Code § 30-1306.
30-1306. Professional relationship unaffected -- Personal and corporate
liability. Nothing contained in this act shall be interpreted to abolish, repeal,
modify, restrict or limit the law now in effect in this state applicable to the
professional relationship and liabilities between the person furnishing the
professional services and the person receiving such professional service and to
the standards for professional conduct. Any officer, shareholder, agent or
employee of a corporation organized under this act shall remain personally and
fully liable and accountable for any negligent or wrongful acts or misconduct
committed by him, or by any person under his direct supervision and control,
while rendering professional services on behalf of the corporation to the person
for whom such professional services were being rendered. The corporation shall
be liable up to the full value of its property for any negligent or wrongful acts or
misconduct committed by any of its officers, shareholders, agents or employees
while they are engaged on behalf of the corporation in the rendering of
professional services.

***
After losing this case, Sallaz & Gatewood formed a professional limited liability company
on March 9,2009, through which they claim to be providing "legal services." Even assuming
their entity is now a professi9nallimited liability company, although there is no record they
terminated their previous partnership or professional services corporation or that they have
merged these entities, the limited liability company would also be directly liable for Gatewood's
negligence.
30-6-201A. Professional company. (1) Section 30-6-201, Idaho Code, shall not be
deemed to authorize a professional company to render allied professional services
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where the laws pertaining to specific professions or the codes of ethics or
professional responsibility of any of the professions involved in such a proposed
professional company prohibit such a combination of professional services.

***

(3) Nothing contained in this section shall be interpreted to abolish, repeal, modify,
restrict or limit the law now in effect in this state applicable to the professional
relationship and liabilities between the person furnishing the professional services
and the person receiving such professional services or to the standards for
professional conduct. Notwithstanding section 30-6-304(1), Idaho Code, any
manager, member, agent or employee of a professional company organized under
this chapter shall remain personally and fully liable and accountable for any
negligent or wrongful acts or misconduct committed by him, or by any person
under his direct supervision and control, while rendering professional services on
behalf of the professional company to the person for whom such professional
services were being rendered. The professional company shall be liable up to the
full value of its property for any negligent or wrongful acts or misconduct
committed by any of its managers, members, agents or employees while they are
engaged on behalf of the professional company in the rendering of professional
services.

***
Again, in consideration of the clear wording of these statues, the Appellants' contention
"Idaho Law appears to be unequivocal in its provisions that a law firm, as an entity, cannot be
directly sued for, or held liable for malpractice," is without basis in law or fact.
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F. MS. STEPHEN IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL.
Ms. Stephen requests attorney fees according to I.C. § 12-120(3), Rule 41, IAR, and City

a/McCall v. Buxton, 146 Idaho 656, 201 P.3d 629 (2009), and costs according to Rule 40, IAR if
she is the prevailing party on appeal.
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V.
ARGUMENT - CROSS APPEAL
A. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT REDUCED THE DAMAGE AWARD.
In its decision the Court noted, "The damages issue in this case is clouded in part due to
the fact that only portions of the property distribution in the divorce were address in the Plaintiff s
damage claims.,,2 While the observation may be accurate, Ms. Stephen's strategy at trial was
dictated by the parties' actions in the underlying divorce case. First, the parties had not identified
the values of the lion's share of the personal property, but only indicated in the property
settlement agreement which party was to receive that specific property. Frankly, it would have
taken days of testimony, (if not weeks) to address the stated value of each lamp and end table.
The value ofthe vehicles was another issue. Most ofthe vehicles listed were not available
to be appraised or it simply was not cost effective to pursue valuing those assets. Finally, the only
assets other than the vehicles the parties actually identified values for in the decree were the
retirement accounts, the real property and certain debts that Mr. Stephen was assuming. As a trial
tactic, Ms. Stephen chose to address only those items that she could prove were significantly
undervalued or had been misapplied in some manner. She therefore concentrated on the Crescent
Rim property and the paid judgment as the damages resulting from her attorneys' negligence and
informed Judge McLaughlin of this intention pre-trial.
Ms. Stephen raises this issue on appeal as she believed the Court erred in its application
and reduction of the damages award by reducing the $41,500 it calculated as Ms. Stephen's

2

Findings of Fact, p. 12.
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damages by $14,065. In its decision, the Court stated, "The actual equalization was $33,935 (112
of$67,870), when in fact the Plaintiff received $48,000.00 thus there was $14,065 paid in excess
of the equalization.,,3 Ms. Stephen respectfully asserts that reducing the award under the
circumstances was error.
1. The Court Should Not Have Disturbed The "Equalization" Payment Agreement.
The testimony by Mr. Stephen's attorney at trial confirmed Mr. Stephen agreed to the
$2,000.00 monthly "equalization" payments because he did not have the cash to pay Ms. Stephen
$33,935.00 in August 2004 to equalize the property distribution. Consequently, Mr. Stephen,
through his counsel negotiated a $2,000.00 payment for 24 months so that he did not have to pay
Ms. Stephen $33,935 at thaHime. In other words, Mr. Stephen agreed to pay more than the
equalization payment in consideration of the benefit he would obtain by not having to pay Ms.
Stephen $33,935 in August 2004 when she was entitled to receive this money.
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August 2004 or that he would not have agreed to similar "equalization" payments considering the
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Ms. Stephens argues that as the "equalization" agreement was fully executed, there was no
legal or factual basis for the Court to have set aside this contract and doing so now provides a
benefit to the Appellants. During the trial below the Appellants presented no facts or legal
argument to support rescinding this executed contract. The Appellants never called Mr. Stephen,
so there was no testimony from him that regardless of the increased valuation of the Crescent Rim
home and the deduction for the paid judgment he would have had cash to pay Ms. Stephen in

3

Findings of Fact, p. 14.
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Even without Mr. Stephen's testimony, based on the undisputed fact that Mr. Stephen did
not have the money to pay Ms. Stephen $33,935 in August 2004, as confirmed by Ms. Shepard,
when considered in light of the Court's ruling that added $83,000.00 to the value ofthe estate,
there is no doubt that Mr. Stephens would not have had the money to pay Ms. Stephen in cash for
the increased value of the estate had the Appellants in this case not committed negligence. Mr.
Stephen therefore had to make some accommodation at the original trial and it is equally likely
that under the circumstances created by the Court's ruling Mr. Stephen would have had to make
similar arrangements to pay his debt to Ms. Stephen. For the ruling to stand there had to have
been evidence that Mr. Stephen could have been able to pay Ms. Stephen in cash in August 2004
to equalize the distribution of assets. Without such proof, and there was no evidence presented to
support such a contention, to deduct the full $48,000 as of August 2004 as ifit had been paid is
clear error. Under the circumstances, as the "equalization" contract was negotiated and fully
executed and as there was no proof that Mr. Stephen could have paid the $33,935 (or more) in
August 2004, Ms. Stephen r~spectfully argues the Court erred by revisiting this contract and
setting it aside.
2. Ms. Stephen Did Not Receive $2,000.00 Per Month.
The Decree indicates that Mr. Stephen only had to pay Ms. Stephen $1,570.00 per month
if Ms. Stephen lived in the Beach Street home. Mr. Stephen negotiated a deduction of$430.00
per month (half of the mortgage payment for his now separate property mortgage) if Ms. Stephen
lived in the home for two years, which the evidence confirmed she had. Based on this
arrangement, Mr. Stephen was getting (at least) half of the mortgage on his now separate property
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I
paid and did not have to pay the full $2,000 per month. Yes, Ms. Stephen received a place to live,
but Mr. Stephen benefited by offsetting the "equalization" payment $430 ($10,320) to apply to
pay his mortgage. To be fair, if the Court was going to invalidate the "equalization" agreement,
the Court should only have allotted $37,680 (24 x $1,570.00), not $48,000 when considering an
offset. Based on this scenario, Mr. Stephen only paid $3,745 above the equalization figure of
$33,935, so the Court should only have offset $3,745 from the damages figure ($41,000) and not
$14,065.
3. Ms. Stephen Is Entitled To Some Consideration.
Based on the Court's' ruling, subtracting the "consideration" that Mr. Stephens had agreed
to pay for the benefit of not having to pay Ms. Stephen $33,935 in August 2004 when it was due,
there was not an equitable distribution in August 2004, as Ms. Stephen did not receive the

-l*

equivalent of her $33,935 for two years. To equalize the distribution in August 2004, Ms.
Stephen would be entitled to a reasonable interest rate to compensate her for not actually
receiving this money when the decree was entered.

B. APPELLANT SALLAZ IS PERSONALLY LIABLE.
The Appellants' Attorney fee agreement does not single out Mr. Gatewood as the
responsible attorney, but indicates that Ms. Stephen was hiring the attorneys of the firm.
(Plaintiff's Ex. 100.) Thereafter, Appellant Sallaz' name appeared on all pleadings in the top left
hand margin as required by Rule 10(a)(I), IRCP. (See for example Plaintiff's Ex. 110, where both
Sallaz and Gatewood are listed individually and they indicated they are Ms. Stephens
"Attorneys.") Rule 10, IRCP requires all attorneys appearing for a party to be listed.
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Based on these facts, Ms. Stephen established reasonable grounds to believe she had hired
both Defendants Sallaz and Gatewood as her counsel and that as both of the attorneys had filed an
appearance on her behalf, they may be liable to her personally.
Appellant Sallaz was successful in convincing the Court that he had no personal liability
to Ms. Stephen because he testified he never met her nor represented to her personally that he was
her lawyer, despite the fact that he had appeared as her attorney of record in the divorce case. Ms.
Stephen now argues that while Idaho Code § 30-1306, may act to insulate non-involved members
of a Professional Limited Liability Company from liability for the negligent conduct of another
member, such protection should not apply to an attorney who had actually appeared of record in
the case. It would seem to contradict every duty that an attorney owes to a client to appear in a
case, do absolutely nothing for the client, and then avoid responsibility by claiming the other
attorney who also had appeared was responsible. Additionally, the evidence presented at trial
established that Sallaz was clearly the more experienced attorney and as an attorney of record
Sallaz had a duty to ensure his less-experienced partner acted appropriately.
Ms. Stephen also established at trial that when she contracted for legal services, Sallaz and
Gatewood was a general partnership. The Appellants, although thereafter forming a professional
services corporation, failed to present any evidence the corporation had assumed, ratified or
accepted any contracts for services made with the partnership. Nor did the Appellants seek to
modify the partnership contracts to indicate Ms. Stephen was contracting with the new entity.
Finally, the Appellants presented no evidence they had dissolved the partnership or intended to
dissolve the partnership, or had filed the requisite Statement of Dissolution as required by I.e. §
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53-3-805.
As Ms. Stephen's contracted with the general partnership, and there is no evidence the
partnership was dissolved or terminated, both Gatewood and Sallaz as the partners remain
personally liable to Ms. Stephen for the negligence committed by either partner. I.e. § 53-3-306.
C. MS. STEPHEN IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON HER CROSS APPEAL.
Ms. Stephen also requests attorney fees according to I.C. § 12-120(3), City o/McCall v.

Buxton, 146 Idaho 656,201 P.3d 629 (2009), and Rule 41, IAR; and costs according to Rule 40,
IAR if she is the prevailing party on her cross appeal.
VI.

CONCLUSION
APPEAL
1. There was substantial and competence evidence to support the Court's Findings of Facts
and Conclusions of Law - regardless of the Respondent's mental condition. This Court
should therefore affirm Judge McLaughlin's decision.
2. The District Court was correct in denying the affirmative defenses of judicial estoppel and
judgmental immunity as the evidence indicates the Respondent was unaware of certain
important facts and the Appellants failed to conduct even a minimal investigation
regarding facts relevant to the divorce proceedings. This Court should therefore also
affirm Judge McLaughlin's decision.
3. As the prevailing party on this appeal, Ms. Stephen is entitled to attorney fees and costs as
claimed herein.
CROSS APPEAL
1. The Trial Court erred when it reduced the equalization payment to which the parties
agreed in consideration for Mr. Stephen having 24 months to pay to equalize the
community estate. The Respondent is entitled to an additional $14,065 in damages, and
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asks this Court to remand the case with direction for entry of an amended judgment adding
this amount, plus accruing post judgment interest.
2. The Trial Court erred when it found that Appellant Sallaz was not personally liable to the
Respondent, although the law firm was a partnership, and although·Sallaz had appeared as
the Respondent's attorney of record, yet did nothing to ensure her case was pursued
appropriately. On remand, the Respondent asks this Court to direct the District Court to
amend the judgment to indicate.the judgment is entered against Appellant Sallaz
individually.
3. As the prevailing party on this cross appeal, Ms. Stephen is entitled to attorney fees and
costs as claimed herein.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 27th day of July, 2010.
CLARK & ASSOCIATES, ATTORNEYS

~-Respondent~
Cross Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 27th day of July 2010, I caused to be served in the
manner indicated a true and correct copy of the foregoing to the following:

Gary L. Quigley
Attorney at Law
P.O. Box 1296
Meridian, ID 83680

US Mail, Postage Prepaid

Attorney for Appellant/Cross-Respondent Sallaz and
for Cross-Respondents Sallaz & Gatewood, CHTD., and Scott Gatewood

II.·.

Eric R. Clark
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